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The Under-Appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade Judiciaries
James Thuo Gathii*

Introduction
This paper focuses on African Regional Trade Agreement, (RTA), judiciaries. African RTAs
entertain a broad range of disputes from an extremely broad category of litigants. They are not
simply custodians of the trading arrangements – in fact they do much less dispute settlement
around trade issues compared to the broad range of cases they have assumed jurisdiction over.
Many of these judiciaries as we shall see have also often entertained cases that are well beyond
their treaty defined jurisdictional bases. So while it is true as William Davey has correctly argued
that RTA judiciaries have rarely been used to resolve trade disputes, in Africa there has been an
exponential use of these judiciaries without much acknowledgement in the academic literature. 1

As this paper also shows, another feature of African RTA judiciaries that comes out clearly is
their boldness of the decisions in relation to the fact they are relatively new institutions operating
in a context in which adherence to notions of national sovereignty is very strong. The East
African Court of Justice has, for example, decided cases relating to human rights even though
there is no explicit treaty basis for the court to assume jurisdiction over human rights cases that
challenge the conduct of Member State governments. For taking such bold steps, the leaders of
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1
See William Davey “The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements,” 8 World Trade Review
5, 15 (2009). By contrast, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has received lots of
attention, see for example, Obiora C. Okafor, The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and
International Institutions, 2007.
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the East African Community amended the Treaty Establishing the East African Community as a
statement of the disapproval of East African Court of Justice’s decision in the Nyong’o case.
Another example is the ECOWAS Court of Justice whose jurisdiction was expanded in 2005 to
allow cases challenging the conduct of Member States with respect to human rights, a
jurisdiction it has since not spared in its use. In short, this paper shows that African RTA
judiciaries are not sleeping sentinels of the treaties under which they are established. This paper
is therefore, a call for more attention to be focused on these judiciaries. Of the eight RTAs that
are regarded as pillars to the African Economic Community, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
and the Intergovernmental Organization on Development (IGAD) do not have judiciaries that so
far as I could find are operational.

The COMESA Court of Justice

The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (hereinafter
‘Treaty’) established the COMESA Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘CoJ’). 2 The Treaty mandates
that the CoJ ‘shall ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of this
Treaty.’ 3 Judgments of the CoJ are ‘final and conclusive and not open to appeal.’ 4 ‘Any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of th[e] Treaty or any of the matters referred to the
[CoJ] . . . shall not be subjected to any method of settlement other than those provided for in
th[e] Treaty.’ 5

2

Treaty Establishing the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, (adopted Dec. 21, 1981, came into force
Sept. 30, 1982), at Art. 7(1)(c).
3
Ibid. at Art. 19.
4
Ibid. at Art. 31(1).
5
Ibid. at Art. 34(1).
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The CoJ is composed of seven judges, appointed by the Authority, and chosen based upon their
qualifications as impartial and independent judges in their own countries. 6 No two judges may
be nationals of the same Member State. 7 The judges on the CoJ serve a five-year term and may
be re-appointed to an additional five-year term. 8 The judges on the CoJ were first appointed by
the Authority on June 30, 1998. 9 In March 2003 the Authority decided that the seat of the CoJ
would be Khartoum, Sudan. 10

Decisions of the CoJ on the interpretation of the Treaty precede the decisions of the Member
States’ national courts. 11 However, ‘[e]xcept where the jurisdiction is conferred on the [CoJ] by
or under [the] Treaty, disputes to which the Common Market is a party shall not on that ground
alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of national courts.’ 12 As discussed below, Member
States’ national courts may request a preliminary ruling from the CoJ where a question is raised
before such national court concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty or the
validity of an action by COMESA. 13 Where any such question is raised in a Member State’s
national court and the laws of that Member State do not provide for a judicial remedy for such
violation of the Treaty, the national court shall refer the entire matter to the CoJ. 14

Jurisdiction

6

Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 20.
Ibid. at Art. 20(2).
8
Ibid. at Art. 21(1).
9
COMESA Web Site, ‘COMESA Court of Justice’, available at http://about.comesa.int/lang-en/institutions/courtof-justice.
10
Ibid.
11
Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 29(2).
12
Ibid. at Art. 29(1).
13
Ibid. at Art. 30(1).
14
Ibid. at Art. 30(2).
7
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The Treaty provides that the CoJ has ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters which may be
referred to it pursuant to this Treaty.’ 15 ‘The Authority, the Council or a Member State may
request the Court to give an advisory opinion regarding questions of law arising from the
provisions of this Treaty affecting [COMESA].’ 16 Where a Member State considers that
another Member State or the Council has acted or omitted to act in violation of the Treaty, such
Member State may refer the matter to the CoJ.17 Member States may also refer matters
involving ‘the legality of any act, regulation, directive or decision of the Council on the grounds
that such act, regulation, directive or decision is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of the
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application or amounts to a misuse or
abuse of power.’ 18

Where the Secretary-General considers that a Member State has violated the Treaty, s/he submits
hi/hers findings to the Member State concerned so that the Member State may submit its findings
on the matter. 19 Where such Member State does not submit its findings, or such findings are
unsatisfactory, the Secretary-General then presents the issue to the Council for consideration. 20
If ‘the Council fails to resolve the matter, the Council shall direct the Secretary-General to refer
the matter to the [CoJ].’21

15

Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 23.
Ibid. at Art. 32(1).
17
Ibid. at Art. 24(1).
18
Ibid. at Art. 24(2).
19
Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 25(1).
20
Ibid. at Art. 25(2).
21
Ibid. at Art. 25(3).
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Natural and legal persons may refer matters to the COJ which involve actions or omissions of the
Council or a Member State which violate the Treaty. 22 ‘[W]here the matter for determination
relates to any act, regulation, directive or decision by a Member State, such person shall not refer
the matter for determination under this Article unless s/he has first exhausted local remedies in
the national courts or tribunals of the Member State.’ 23 This grant of standing to natural and legal
persons illustrates the broadness of jurisdiction of not only the COMESA COJ but indeed all
other African RTA judiciaries discussed in this paper. 24

The CoJ also has ‘jurisdiction to hear disputes between [COMESA] and its employees that arise
out of the application and interpretation of the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Secretariat or
the terms and conditions of employment of the employees of [COMESA].’ 25 The CoJ may also
hear claims by third parties against COMESA or any of its institutions for acts of COMESA
employees in the performance of their official duties. 26

Where COMESA, or any of its institutions, is a party to an agreement, and such agreement
allows the CoJ to arbitrate, then the CoJ has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 27 Where there is a
dispute between Member States and they make a special agreement to allow the CoJ to hear the
case, the CoJ has jurisdiction to hear such dispute. 28 Member States’ national courts may also
request a preliminary ruling from the CoJ where a question is raised before such national court

22

Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 26.
Ibid.
24
Ibid.; See J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Lawmakers, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 116 (arguing
that ‘African institutions anticipate international organizations charged with discharging the kind of plenary
executive, legislative, and even judicial powers once associated exclusively with national governments.’).
25
Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 27(1).
26
Ibid. at Art. 27(2).
27
Ibid. at Art. 28(a).
28
Ibid. at Art. 28(b).
23
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concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty or the validity of an action by
COMESA. 29 Where any such question is raised in a Member State’s national court and the laws
of that Member State do not provide for a judicial remedy for such violation of the Treaty, the
national court shall refer the entire matter to the CoJ.30

The COMESA Council of Ministers is explicitly given the power and responsibility to ‘give
directions to all other subordinate organs of the Common Market other than the [CoJ] in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.’ 31 This clause gives the CoJ freedom from intervention by the
executive and legislative institutions of COMESA. Perhaps more important is Article 34 of the
Treaty, which provides: the CoJ shall be the sole interpreter of the Treaty; 32 where a dispute has
been referred to the CoJ, ‘Member States shall refrain from any action which might be
detrimental to the resolution of the dispute or might aggravate the dispute’; 33 that both Member
States and the Council must ‘take, without delay, the measures required to implement a judgment
of the [CoJ]’; 34 and the CoJ ‘may prescribe such sanctions as it shall consider necessary to be
imposed against a party who defaults in implementing the decisions of the Court.’ 35

Former Lord President of the Court of Justice of COMESA, Honorable Mr. Justice A. M.
Akiwumi, has opined that the CoJ has ‘brought together persons of differing legal traditions to
29

Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 30(1).
Ibid. at Art. 30(2).
31
Treaty Establishing COMESA, supra note 1, at Art. 9(2)(c) (emphasis added).
32
Ibid. at Art. 34(1).
33
Ibid. at Art. 34(2).
34
Ibid. at Art. 34(3).
35
Ibid. at Art. 34(4).
30
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produce a smooth-functioning and authoritative institution’, an impressive feat given the varying
legal traditions of the COMESA Member States. 36

The East African Court of Justice
The East African Court of Justice, (hereafter ‘EACJ’), is established under the Treaty
Establishing the East African Community. 37 The EACJ is tasked with ‘ensur[ing] the adherence
to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with [the EAC] Treaty.’ 38 The
EAC Treaty gives the EACJ ‘jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of [the EAC]
Treaty . . . [as well as] such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as . . .
determined by the Council . . . [in] a protocol . . . .’ 39 Decisions of the EACJ are ‘final, binding
and conclusive and not open to appeal . . .’ 40 and ‘[a]ny dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of [the EAC] Treaty . . . shall not be subjected to any method of settlement other than
those provided for in [the EAC] Treaty.’ 41 The Court became operational on November 30,
2001, but has since remained in a transitional period, meaning that it only convenes when the

36

A.M. Akiwumi, ‘Towards an Independent and Effective Judiciary in Africa’, Speech given at the African
Development Forum Conference entitled ‘Governance for a Progressing Africa’ held in Addis Ababa, (Oct. 11-15,
2004), available at www.uneca.org/adfiv/documents/speeches_and_presentations/speech_akiwumi.htm. Notably, In
May 2010, the COMESA COJ announced that it had contracted with a company to develop a website which ‘will
provide information on the establishment of the Court, how to access the Court, judgements [sic], advisory opinions,
arbitration awards, pending cases and news updates from the Court. Once operational, the public will be able to file
cases and even conduct searches on cases and rulings online, see ‘COMESA Court of Justice to Improve its
Visibility’, (May 30, 2010), available at www.comesa.int/lang-en/component/content/article/34-general-news/382comesa-court-of-justice-to-improve-its-visibility.
37
Treaty Establishing the East African Community (Adopted Nov. 30, 1999, Came into Force July 7, 2000,
Amended Dec. 14, 2006 and Aug. 20, 2007) (establishing a regional economic community between Kenya, Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania).
38
Ibid. at Art. 23(1).
39
Ibid. at Art. 27.
40
Ibid. at Art. 35(1).
41
Ibid. at Art. 38(1).
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need to do so arises, because the Summit has not yet determined that there is enough business to
make it fully operational. 42

The EAC Treaty provides that the judges on the EACJ are to be appointed to the Summit on
recommendation by the Partner States. 43 Before the 2006 amendments, the EAC Treaty
provided that the EACJ would consist of no more than six judges with no more than two from
each of the original three Partner States. 44 The EAC Treaty as amended split the EAC into a
First Instance Division and an Appellate Division and provides that the court shall be composed
of a maximum of fifteen judges with a maximum of ten for the First Instance Division and five
for the Appellate Division. 45 No more than two judges from each of the now five Partner States
can be appointed to the First Instance Division and no more than one from each Partner State to
the Appellate Division. 46 The seat of the EACJ is to be determined by the Summit.47 The
Summit has not yet determined the permanent seat of the Court, but the temporary seat is in
Arusha, Tanzania. 48 In August, 2010, the EACJ Court of Appeals held a sitting in Nairobi,
Kenya as part of its program to familiarize East African citizens of its role while announcing the
appellate decision in the Nyong’o case. 49 It has also had similar temporary sittings in other East
African cities such as Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Kampala.

42

East African Community Web Site, ‘East African Court of Justice – Role of the Court’, Corporate
Communications and Public Affairs Department, available at www.eac.int/organs/eacj.html?start=2.
43
EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 24(1).
44
Ibid. at Art. 24 (as adopted Nov. 30, 1999).
45
Ibid. at Art. 24(2) (Adopted Nov. 30, 1999, Amended Dec. 14, 2006 and Aug. 20, 2007).
46
Ibid. at Art. 24(1).
47
Ibid. at Art. 47.
48
East African Community Web Site, ‘East African Court of Justice – Review of Judgments’, Corporate
Communications and Public Affairs Department, available at www.eac.int/organs/eacj.html?start=5.
49
Press Release: ‘East African Court Takes Justice Closer to the People’, (Aug. 13, 2010), available at
http://news.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276:eacj-closer-to-the-people&catid=48:eaclatest&Itemid=69.
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The EAC Treaty states that the decisions of the EACJ on the interpretation and application of the
EAC Treaty have precedence over the decisions of the national courts. 50 Where jurisdiction is
conferred upon the EACJ the national courts have no jurisdiction. 51 However, simply because
the Community is a party to a dispute does not mean that the dispute is excluded from the
jurisdiction of the national courts. 52

The EACJ expanded the scope of its jurisdiction in 2007 with its decision in Prof. Peter Anyang’
Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others. 53 The Court had been petitioned
under Article 30 54 to enjoin the swearing-in of Kenya’s nine members of the East African
Legislative Assembly (hereafter ‘EALA’). 55 The claimant’s contended that Kenya had violated
Article 50 of the EAC Treaty when selecting its nine members and that the elections were
therefore void. 56 Article 50 provides that ‘ the elected members shall, as much as feasible, be
representative of specified groups, and sets out the qualifications for election.’ 57 The Attorney
General of Kenya, in a petition for the respondents, argued that Article 52(1) specifically
reserved jurisdiction to the High Court of Kenya, and so the EACJ did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case. 58 That article provides, in relevant part ‘Any question that may arise whether any
person is an elected member of the Assembly . . . shall be determined by the institution of the

50

EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 33(2).
Ibid. at Art. 33(1).
52
Ibid.
53
Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others, East African Court of Justice,
Reference No. 1 of 2006 (Mar. 30, 2007).
54
EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 30.
55
Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others, supra note 53, at 2.
56
Ibid. at 3.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid. at 13.
51
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Partner State that determines questions of the election of members of the National Assembly.’. 59
The EACJ, however, disagreed, finding that since an Article 50 election had not taken place,
application of Article 52(1) in the first instance was precluded. 60

Senior officials within the EAC Partner States and justices on the highest national courts have
supported a movement that would allow appeals from the highest national courts to the EACJ. 61
This would also give the Court greater authority to punish corruption, strengthen the judiciaries
within the region, and harmonize the judicial branches of the Partner States and the EAC itself. 62

There is also a proposal to amend the EAC treaty to give the EACJ the authority to try human
rights violators. 63 As the Honorable Justice Harold Reginald Nsekela, President of the EACJ,
has argued:
If East Africans are serious about meaningful regional integration,
they must be willing and prepared to invest in it, particularly in
institutions that will make people develop with dignity. A fullyfledged East African Court of Justice with all its attendant
jurisdictional roles is one such institution. East African leaders
cannot expect a strong East African Community unless they invest
in institutions that will guarantee its existence. We should not
expect to reap where we have not sown. 64

59

EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 52(1).
Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others, supra note 53, at 14-22.
61
J. Karuhanga, ‘EAC Judges Call for Stronger Judicial Systems’, The New Times (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200912100297.html.
62
J. Oyuke, ‘EAC Judges Call for a Harmonized Judiciary’, The Standard (Jan. 3, 2010), available at
www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000000137&cid=14&j=&m=&d.
63
F. Oluoch, ‘Bid to Let Regional Court of Justice Try Genocide and Human Rights Suspects’, East African (Oct.
12, 2009), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200910120115.html.
64
President of the East African Court of Justice H.R. Nsekela, ‘The Role of the East African Court of Justice in the
Integration Process’, Presentation During the 3rd East African Community Media Summit (Aug. 22, 2009).
60
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The EAC National Human Rights Commission has reviewed the draft EAC Bill of Rights. 65
‘The EAC draft Bill attempts to harmonise the rights and freedoms obtaining in the Partner
States. It examines the various national constitutions and other international and regional
instruments with a view to standardize and adopt international best practices.’ 66 The bill, which
contains the right to a fair hearing 67, would require Partner States to guarantee a large number of
rights or be in violation of the EAC Treaty, which in turn would grant the EACJ greater
jurisdiction.

Partner States may request advisory opinions from the EACJ. 68 Additionally, Partner States can
refer a matter to the EACJ for adjudication where that state ‘considers that another Partner State
or an organ or institution of the Community has failed to fulfill an obligation under [the EAC]
Treaty or has infringed a provision of [the EAC] Treaty.’ 69 The EAC Treaty also provides:
A Partner State may refer for determination by the Court,
legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action on
ground that it is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to
application or amounts to a misuse or abuse of power. 70

the
the
the
its

65

Press Release: ‘Heads of Human Rights’ Commissions Review EAC Draft Bill of Rights’, (EAC Department of
Corporate Communications and Public Affairs, June 1, 2010), available at
www.news.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=250:heads-of-human-rights-commissionsreview-eac-draft-bill-of-rights&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid=69; Press Release: ‘Heads of Human Rights
Commissions Recommend Draft EAC Bill of Rights to Council of Ministers’, (EAC Department of Corporate
Communications and Public Affairs, June 4, 2010), available at:
http://www.news.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=253:nhrcs-recommend-bill-ofrights&catid=48:eac-latest&Itemid=69 (The National Human Rights Commission has recommended the Bill of
Rights to the EAC Council of Ministers and will be discussed at EAC Conference on Good Governance in August)
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 36.
69
Ibid. at Art. 28(1).
70
Ibid. at Art. 28(2).
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Where a question is raised before a national court regarding the validity of some act by the
Community the court may request the EACJ to give a preliminary ruling. 71 In such a case, the
national court is merely asking the EACJ for an opinion on the matter and is still responsible for
issuing the ultimate decision. The national court does not have to request such a ruling and can
interpret the EAC Treaty on its own. 72 However, this is subject to the caveat that any decisions
made by the EACJ on ‘similar matter[s]’ have precedence. 73

Any natural or legal person who is a resident of a Partner State may refer any matter regarding
‘the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner State or an
institution of the Community on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or
action is unlawful or is an infringement of the [EAC] Treaty.’ 74 In Nyong’o the Attorney
General of Kenya argued that the claimants did not have locus standi and therefore no cause of
action existed for the claimants. 75 The court recognized that in order for an adverse litigant to
possess locus standi he must: (1) have sufficient interest in the subject matter of the adjudication;
and (2) ‘be seeking a remedy in respect of a legal right, which has been infringed or violated.’ 76
However, the Court determined that these requirements apply more to ‘actions in tort and suits
for breach of statutory duty or breach of contract. . . . [A] cause of action created by statute or
other legislation . . . [has i]ts parameters . . . defined by the statute or legislation which creates
it.’ 77 Therefore, since Article 30 imposes no locus standi requirement no such requirement exists

71

Ibid. at Art. 34.
Ibid. at Art. 33(1).
73
Ibid. at Art. 33(2).
74
Ibid. at Art. 30.
75
Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others, supra note 53, at 12.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid. at 15.
72
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for suits brought under Article 30. 78 The same rule applies for Articles 28 (Partner States) and
29 (EAC Secretary General). As such, the EACJ like the COMESA COJ can entertain suits from
an extremely broad range of litigants. This is hardly the practice in the European Court of Justice
or even the International Court of Justice which only entertain suits between States only.

Where the EAC Secretary General considers that a Partner State has violated the EAC Treaty its
findings are submitted to that Partner State to submit its observations on the findings. 79 Where
such state fails to submit observations within four months, or where the observations are not
satisfactory, the Secretary General then refers the matter to the Council who must then decide to
either immediately resolve the issue or order the Secretary General to submit the matter to the
EACJ.80

The Summit, the highest organ in the community, can request advisory opinions. 81 The EAC
Council, the second-highest organ in the community, may also request advisory opinions. 82
On April 29, 2009 the EACJ released an advisory opinion on the conflicting principles of
variable geometry and consensus in the EAC’s decision-making process which I have discussed
at length elswhere. 83

78

Ibid. at 16.
EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 29(1).
80
Ibid. at Art. 29(2)-(3).
81
Ibid. at Art. 36.
82
Ibid. at Arts. 14(4) and 36.
83
In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion,
East African Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, App. No. 1 of 2008 (Apr. 2009). See James Gathii, “African
Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes,” 35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation, 571 (2010)
79
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The EACJ has jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes between the EAC and its employees
where the dispute arises out of ‘terms and conditions of employment . . . or the application and
interpretation of the staff rules and regulations and terms and conditions of service of the
[EAC].’84 The EACJ can also hear disputes arising from:
[A]n arbitration clause contained in a contract or agreement which
confers such jurisdiction to which the Community or any of its
institutions is a party; or a dispute between the Partner States
regarding this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a
special agreement between the Partner States concerned; or an
arbitration clause contained in a commercial contract or agreement
in which the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the Court. 85

On November 20, 2009 the EAC Summit ratified a protocol establishing the EAC Common
Market. 86 The protocol states ‘[a]ny dispute between the Partner States arising from the
interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
the Treaty.’ 87 Furthermore, the Partner States guaranteed:
[A]ny person whose rights and liberties as recognised by this
Protocol have been infringed upon, shall have the right to redress,
even where this infringement has been committed by persons
acting in their official capacities; and . . . the competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authority or any other competent
authority, shall rule on the rights of the person who is seeking
redress. 88
Judges on the EACJ may hold office for a maximum of seven years. 89 A judge is to hold office
for his or her full term unless: (1) s/he resigns; (2) s/he attains the age of 70; (3) s/he dies; or (4)

84

EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 31.
Ibid. at Art. 32.
86
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, East African Community
(Adopted Nov. 20, 2009).
87
Ibid. at Art. 54(1).
88
Ibid. at Art. 54(2).
89
EAC Treaty, supra note 37, at Art. 25(1).
85
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s/he is removed from office in accordance with the EAC Treaty. 90 Under Article 26(1), a judge
may only be removed from office by the Summit:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

for misconduct or for inability to perform the functions of
his or her office due to infirmity of mind or body; . . .
in the case of a judge who also holds judicial office or other
public office in a Partner State–
(i)
is removed from that office for misconduct or due
to inability to perform the functions of the office for
any reason; or
(ii)
resigns from that office following allegation of
misconduct or of inability to perform the functions
of the office for any reason;
if the Judge is adjudged bankrupt under any law in force in
a Partner State; or
if the Judge is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty
or fraud or moral turpitude under any law in force in a
Partner State. 91

The Summit may also suspend a judge when an investigation as to misconduct is pending
or where the judge is charged with an offense under Article 26(1)(d). 92

The EACJ’s Jurisprudence
Based on the EACJ’s decisions in Nyong’o, discussed above, East African Law Society,
discussed below, Katabazi, discussed below, and the events surrounding those decisions it would
seem that the EACJ has a greater amount of independence than intended by the drafters of the
EAC Treaty. As will be seen in the following analysis of East African Law Society, the Court
has asserted itself as the supreme authority over the EAC Treaty.

In November 2006 the EACJ issued an interim order to prevent Kenya’s appointment of
representatives to the EALA and, in March 2007, the Court decided in Nyong’o, that citizens of
90

Ibid. at Art 25(2).
Ibid. at Art 26(1).
92
Ibid. at Art. 26(2).
91

15

Kenya, despite having no locus standi, could challenge Kenya’s appointments under Article 30
of the EAC Treaty. 93 The EAC Council criticized this exercise of jurisdiction and recommended
to the Summit that certain amendments be passed to curtail the Court’s power, ultimately
resulting in the EAC Treaty’s amendment on December 14, 2006. 94 These amendments
included: (1) restructuring the Court into two divisions, a First Instance Division and an
Appellate Division; (2) adding additional grounds for removing a judge from office; “to limit the
Court’s jurisdiction so as not to apply to ‘jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of
Partner States”; (3) adding in a two-month time limit for cases brought by legal and natural
persons; and (4) providing grounds for appeal to the Appellate Division of the EACJ.95

The amendments allow the removal from office of an EACJ judge who also holds judicial office
in a Partner State where that judge is removed from office for misconduct in that position. 96 At
the time this amendment was passed the two Kenyan judges were in the middle of just such a
suspension following allegations of corruption against them that had been made in 2003. 97 The
Kenyan government attempted to get these two justices, Justices Moijo ole Keiwua and Kasanga
Mulwa, removed from the EACJ bench pursuant to the amendments, but their efforts were
stopped dead in their tracks. 98

93

East African Law Society and Others v. Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and Others, East African
Court of Justice Judgment Ref. No. 3 of 2007, (Sept. 2008), p. 2-3. For more on this see supra “Natural and Legal
Persons”.
94
Ibid. at 4. While the final decision in Nyong’o was not released until four months after the amendments, the Court
had announced that it was granting the claimants jurisdiction in November 2006. Ibid. at 3.
95
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Several East African national law societies, using Article 30, then challenged the legality under
Article 150 [Amendment of the Treaty] of the EAC Treaty of the ratification procedures that
were employed for these amendments. 99 The four respondents, as in Nyong’o, challenged the
capacity of the claimant law societies to bring the issue before the Court. The Attorney General
of Tanzania and the Secretary General of the EAC argued ‘that under international law, the
applicants were not competent to challenge the sovereign right of the Partner States to amend the
Treaty to which they were parties.’ 100 The EACJ concluded that the claimants were not
challenging the Partner States’ sovereign right to amend, rather they were contesting the failure
to abide by the amendment procedures prescribed by the EAC Treaty. 101

The Attorney General of Uganda argued that the claim was ‘incompetent and misconceived
because there was no dispute amongst the parties to the [EAC] Treaty.’ 102 Since Article 30 gives
legal persons the right to petition the court when there is an infringement of the Treaty this
argument was deemed irrelevant. 103

The Attorney General of Kenya argued that the amendments were actually decisions of the
Summit and, thus, not reviewable under Article 30. 104 The Court decided that even though
Article 30 makes no mention of an organ of the Community, restricting the Article so that it
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could not be used where an organ violated the Treaty would defeat its purpose. 105 Further, the
court held that:
The alleged infringement is the totality of the process of the Treaty
amendment, which amendment was, and can only be made by the
parties to the Treaty, namely the Partner States, acting together
through the organs of the Community. It follows that if in the
amendment process the Treaty was infringed, it was infringed by
the Partner States. The reference therefore cannot be barred on the
ground that its subject matter are decisions and actions of organs of
the Community. 106
Therefore, the Court had jurisdiction.

The EACJ went on to conclude the ratification process that was used in making the amendments
constituted an infringement of Articles 150, 5(3)(g), and 7(1)(a) of the EAC Treaty because the
Partner States had not allowed the participation of the private sector and civil society in the
drafting of the amendments. 107 However, the Court decided not to invalidate the amendments
because:
[T]he infringement was not a conscious one[;] . . . after this
clarification of the law on the matter the infringement is not likely
to recur[; and] . . . not all the resultant amendments are
incompatible with Treaty objectives . . . . 108

In the case of James Katabazi and 21 Others v. Secretary General of the East African
Community and Another, the EACJ was petitioned to determine the lawfulness of the detention
of Ugandan prisoners. 109 Sixteen people had been brought before the Ugandan High Court and
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charged with treason. 110 The Court granted bail to fourteen of them and the court was
immediately surrounded by security personnel who re-arrested the men, interfered with the
preparation of the bail documents, and took the men back to jail. 111 They were taken before a
military General Court Martial and charged with unlawful possession of firearms and terrorism
stemming from the same facts as the previous charges. 112 The issues of interference with court
process and conducting simultaneous civil and military prosecutions was brought before the
Constitutional Court of Uganda which ruled that the interference was unconstitutional and that
bail had to be granted the men. 113 They were not released and the issue was brought before the
EACJ.114

The respondents, the Secretary General of the East African Community and the Attorney General
of Uganda, challenged the EACJ’s jurisdiction to deal with matters of human rights considering
that no such jurisdiction had been granted by the EAC Treaty or by the Council under Article
27(2). 115 The Court stated that ‘[t]he quick answer is: No [this court] does not have
[jurisdiction].’ 116 The Court went on to say:
It very [sic] clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights
requires a determination of the Council and a conclusion of a
protocol to that effect. Both of those steps have not been taken. It
follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on disputes
concerning violation of human rights per se. 117
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Despite this, the Court determined that ‘[w]hile the Court will not assume jurisdiction to
adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of
interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human
rights violation.’ 118 In other words, as long as a dispute gives the EACJ jurisdiction under
Article 27, the fact that the dispute involves human rights is merely incidental.

The EACJ then discussed whether it had Article 27 jurisdiction. It determined that Article 23
provides that the EACJ ‘shall ensure the adherence to law’, which meant that where the law has
not been adhered to the EACJ would have Article 27(1) jurisdiction to compel adherence. 119 The
Court then determined that Articles 5(1) 120, 6 121, 7(2) 122, and 8(1)(c) 123 require Partner States to
abide by the decisions of their courts. 124 It held:
[T]he intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to
prevent the execution of a lawful Court order violated the principle
of the rule of law and consequently contravened the Treaty.
Abiding by the court decision is the corner stone of the
independence of the judiciary which is one of the principles of the
observation of the rule of law. 125
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Therefore, since the issue in the case was whether Articles 5 through 8 had been adhered to,
Article 23 gave the EACJ Article 27(1) jurisdiction, making the issue of human rights incidental
and giving the Court jurisdiction to hear the case. 126

The EACJ based its decision in Katabazi on the objectives and purposes clauses of the Treaty
which are regarded as preambles that do not create binding obligations. Objectives and purposes
clauses are therefore not thought of as creating independent or substantive grounds for granting
relief. Rather, they are meant to give the treaty context. In 2000, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal put it this way:
[W]hen one is dealing with the object and purpose of a treaty,
which is the most important part of the treaty’s context, the object
and purpose does not constitute an element independent of that
context. The object and purpose is not to be considered in
isolation from the terms of the treaty; it is intrinsic to its text. It
follow that, under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 127, a
treaty’s object and purpose is to be used only to clarify the text, not
to provide independent sources of meaning that contradict the clear
text.128
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Notwithstanding this, the EACJ determined that Article 5(1), which spells out one of the
objectives of the Community, requires Partner States to abide by the decisions of their courts.
The Katabazi decision illustrates the interpretive boldness of the EACJ not only in seizing
jurisdiction over cases that raise sovereignty questions for the member states as well as in
creatively using preambular provisions of the Treaty Establishing the EACJ to determine cases
brought before it when such cases involve human rights which are not an enumerated base for
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ground.
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The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice

The Treaty of ECOWAS (hereinafter ‘Treaty’) establishes the Community Court of Justice
(hereinafter ‘CCJ’). 129 The Treaty limits the CCJ’s authority to ‘perform[ing its] functions and
act[ing] within the limits of the powers conferred on [it] by this Treaty and by the Protocols
relating thereto.’ 130 However, ‘[j]udgments of the Court of Justice [are] binding on the Member
States, the institutions of the Community and on individuals and corporate bodies.’ 131 The CCJ’s
judges were appointed on January 30, 2001. 132

The Community Court Protocol (hereinafter ‘Protocol’) came into force on November 5, 1996 133
and was amended in 2005. 134 The Protocol expanded the CCJ’s authority by mandating:
“The Court has competence to adjudicate on any dispute relating to the following:
a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty,
Conventions and Protocols of the Community;
b) the interpretation and application of the regulations,
directives, decisions and other subsidiary legal instruments
adopted by ECOWAS;
c) the legality of regulations, directives, decisions and other
subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS;
d) the failure by Member States to honour their obligations
under the Treaty, Conventions and Protocols, regulations,
directives, or decisions of ECOWAS;
e) the provisions of the Treaty, Conventions and Protocols,
regulations, directives, or decisions of ECOWAS Member
States;
129
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f) the Community and its officials; and
g) the action for damages against a Community institution or
an official of the Community for any action or omission in
the exercise of official functions.” 135
The Treaty also mandated the creation of an Arbitration Tribunal of the Community. 136 The
Arbitration Tribunal has yet to be set up, but until then the Protocol allows the CCJ to act in that
capacity. 137

The Treaty mandates that ‘[t]he status, composition, powers, procedure and other issues
concerning the Court of Justice shall be as set out in a Protocol relating thereto.’ 138 The Protocol
mandates that the CCJ shall consist of seven judges, appointed by the Authority of Heads of
States and Government from a pool of nominees, two from each state. 139 Members of the CCJ
are appointed for a five-year term and may be reappointed only once.

The Treaty states ‘[t]he Court of Justice shall carry out the functions assigned to it independently
of the Member States and the institutions of the Community.’ 140 Furthermore, the Member
States agreed to ‘undertake to co-operate in judicial and legal matters with a view to harmonizing
their judicial and legal systems.’ 141 The Protocol allows national courts to present certified
questions on issues of interpretation and application of the Treaty and other ECOWAS texts. 142
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Article 10 of the Protocol allows the CCJ to give advisory opinions to any Member State, the
President of the ECOWAS Commission, and any ECOWAS institution upon request. 143 The
Treaty also provides that ‘[a]ny dispute regarding the interpretation or the application of the
provisions of this Treaty shall he [sic] amicably settled through direct agreement without
prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty and relevant Protocols.’ 144 In the event such agreement
cannot be reached, ‘either party or any other Member States or the Authority may refer the
matter to the Court of the Community whose decision shall be final and shall not be subject to
appeal.’ 145 The Protocol authorizes Member States and the Executive Secretary to bring an
action before the CCJ for the alleged failure of a Member State to perform an obligation. 146
Furthermore, Member States, the Council of Ministers, and the Executive Secretary may bring a
proceeding before the CCJ to determine the legality of an action in relation to any ECOWAS
text. 147

The Authority of Heads of States and Government also has the ‘power to grant the Court the
power to adjudicate on any specific dispute that it may refer to the Court other than those
specified in [the Protocol].’ 148 Individuals and corporate bodies may also bring a proceeding
before the CCJ ‘for the determination of an act or inaction of a Community official which
violates the rights of the individuals or corporate bodies.’ 149 Individuals are also explicitly
granted the right to bring cases of violations of human rights before the CCJ. 150

143

Ibid. at Art. 10.
Treaty of ECOWAS, supra note 129, at Art. 76(1).
145
Ibid. at Art. 76(2).
146
Community Court Protocol A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, at Art. 10(a).
147
Ibid. at Art. 10(b).
148
Ibid. at Art. 9(8).
149
Community Court Protocol A/P.1/7/91, supra note 135, at Art. 10(c).
150
Ibid. at Art. 10(d).
144

25

Where an agreement gives the CCJ jurisdiction over dispute settlement, the CCJ has such
jurisdiction. 151 The staff of any ECOWAS institution can also bring an action before the CCJ
once it has ‘exhausted all appeal processes available . . . under the ECOWAS Staff Rules and
Regulations.’ 152 Where an issue of interpretation as to the COMESA Treaty, COMESA
protocols, or COMESA regulations arise within a Member State’s national court, such national
court may, on its own or at the request of a party to the action, refer the issue to the CCJ for
interpretation. 153

Prior to the 2005 amendment of the Protocol by the Supplemental Protocol 154, individuals were
not allowed to bring suit in the CCJ. 155 This was a heavy restriction on the power of the CCJ to
enforce the Treaty upon ECOWAS Member States and ECOWAS stood apart from other RTA
judiciaries which, as we have seen so far, allow such cases. 156 The 2003 case of Olajide Afolabi
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 157 and the 2004 case of Frank Ukor v. Rachard Lalaye 158,
discussed below, emphasized this fact. 159

In 2003 Nigeria closed its common border with Benin, which hurt many of the businesses along
the border. 160 A Nigerian citizen applied to the CCJ to have his suit heard on the ground that the
border closure had caused loss to his business in violation of the Treaty. 161 Nigeria objected to
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the CCJ’s jurisdiction to hear the case under the Treaty and the Protocol. 162 The CCJ agreed and
dismissed the case. In 2004 Benin seized a national’s truck and goods. 163 The citizen applied to
the CCJ to quash the order that his truck and goods be seized as violative of the Treaty. 164 Benin
objected to jurisdiction and, again, the CCJ dismissed the case. 165 These cases are, in large part,
the reason why the Supplemental Protocol was established in 2005. 166

Since the 2005 amendments to the Protocol many citizens of Member States have brought cases
before the CCJ, and many have won. In 2008, a citizen of Niger brought suit in the CCJ against
Niger for failing to protect her human rights, as she had been a slave for almost her entire life. 167
The citizen won the case and was awarded about $17,000. 168

A more controversial decision of the CCJ came in 2009 in the case of Socio-Economic Rights
and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic
Education Commission. 169 In this case, SERAP, a human rights NGO, brought suit in the CCJ as
a legal person against Nigeria for human rights violations on the ground that Nigeria had not
adequately implemented Nigeria's Basic Education Act and Child's Rights Act of 2004, and had
thus violated both the African Charter and the ECOWAS Treaty. 170 Nigeria alleged that the CCJ
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did not have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the express provision of the Protocol. 171 The CCJ
noted that Article 9(4) of the Protocol states ‘[t]he [CCJ] has jurisdiction to determine cases of
violation of human rights that occur in any Member State’; that Article 4(g) of the ECOWAS
Treaty affirms that the Member States must adhere to the ‘recognition promotion and protection
of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights’; and that Article 17 of the African Charter states that ‘[e]very individual
shall have the right to education’. 172 Thus, the CCJ determined that it had jurisdiction, but there
is yet to be a decision on the substantive issues of the case, namely whether Nigeria had actually
violated its citizens’ right to an education. 173

Some commentators believe a severe conflict between the CCJ and the Constitutions of the
various Members States is inevitable, and that the only reason this conflict has yet to come to
light is due to the relative youth of the CCJ. 174 The 2005 Protocol does not give citizens of
Member States the right to have cases involving the interpretation and application of the Treaty.
Instead, it authorizes citizens to bring suits before the CCJ that involve, generally, alleged
violations of the human rights. 175 As pointed out by A.O. Enabulele:
Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Benin, 1990;
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Gambia, 1997; Article 1(2) of
the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992; Article 2 of the
Constitution of Liberia, 1984; [and] Section 1(3) of the
Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeia, 1999; [make] the
various constitutions supreme and binding on all persons and
authorities within their respective spheres of influence. Any law
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that is inconsistent with the provisions of any of the constitutions,
within its sway is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. 176
Therefore, if the CCJ were to hear a human rights case and find that some action by a Member
State violates the Treaty, yet one of that Member State’s national courts also determined the
action was authorized under the national constitution, then there would be an irreconcilable
conflict between national and international law. 177 However, as I have observed elsewhere, the
supremacy of national Constitutions over international law particularly in commonwealtlh
African countries is slowly ebbing away. 178

The SADC Tribunal

The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (hereafter Treaty) establishes the
Tribunal ‘to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and
subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.’ 179 Further
emphasis is given to this objective in Article 32: ‘Any dispute arising from the interpretation or
application of this Treaty, the interpretation, application or validity of Protocols or other
subsidiary instruments made under this Treaty, which cannot be settled amicably, shall be
referred to the Tribunal.’ 180 The Treaty mandates ‘[t]he decisions of the Tribunal shall be final
and binding.’ 181 Furthermore, subsection 2 of Article 16 of the Treaty states ‘[t]he composition,
powers, functions, procedures and other related matters governing the Tribunal shall be
prescribed in a Protocol, which shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 22 of this Treaty,
176
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form an integral part of this Treaty, adopted by the Summit.’ 182 Article 22 is the article that
addresses the requirements of ratification process for protocols to the treaty. 183

The Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof was passed by the Summit in
August 2000 in accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty. 184 While the Tribunal has begun
operating, the Protocol on Tribunal has not yet been ratified by two-thirds of Member States as
required by Article 22. 185 There is much dispute over whether this protocol in particular can be
given effect without such ratification. I will return to this topic below. The Protocol on Tribunal
mandated the Council to determine where the seat of the Tribunal would be located. 186 The
Council eventually chose Windhoek, Namibia. 187

The Treaty for the Establishment of SADC states ‘Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed
for a specified period.’ 188 The Protocol mandates ‘The Tribunal shall consist of not less than ten
(10) Members, appointed from nationals of States who possess the qualifications required for
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective States or who are jurists of
recognised [sic] competence.’ 189 The Summit, on recommendation of the Council, is to appoint
the ten members 190, five of which it is to designate as ‘regular Members’, those who ‘shall sit
regularly on the Tribunal’. 191 The other five ‘constitute a pool from which the President [of the
182
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Tribunal] may invite a Member to sit on the Tribunal whenever a regular Member is temporarily
absent or is otherwise unable to carry out his or her functions.’ 192 The Protocol states that the
Tribunal is constituted by three members, but it may decide to constitute all five for any case. 193
The Tribunal only sits when there is a case submitted to it 194 and the President of the Tribunal
gets to decide who shall sit for any case. 195 The Council may increase the number of members
on a proposal from the Tribunal. 196

At any time, none of the members may be nationals of the same state. 197 To this end, each
Member State nominates one candidate and the Council chooses amongst these candidates, with
due consideration given to gender representation. 198 While, the Members of the Tribunal serve a
five-year term and may only be re-appointed for an additional five-year term. 199 The Tribunal
only sits when there is a case, the Council may decide to make it a full-time position and, if it
does, Members would no longer be allowed to hold any other office or employment. 200
Regardless of this, Members are not allowed to exercise any political or administrative function
or engage in any trade that would interfere with his or her duties, impartiality, or independence
as a member of the Tribunal. 201 The President of the Tribunal is elected by the Members of the
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Tribunal and holds this position for 3 years. 202 Members and the President may resign at any
time and may only be dismissed in accordance with the Tribunal Rules. 203

With regard to the relationship between the tribunal and Member States, the Treaty for the
Establishment of SADC provides that ‘the members of the Tribunal . . . shall be committed to the
international character of SADC, and shall not seek or receive instructions from any Member
States, or from any authority external to SADC.’ 204 The Tribunal ‘may rule on a question of
interpretation, application or validity of the provisions in issue if the question is referred to it by
a court or tribunal of a State.’ 205
The Tribunal also has original jurisdiction over:
all disputes and all applications referred to it in accordance with
the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to:
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty;
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all
subsidiary instruments adopted within the framework of the
Community, and acts of the institutions of the Community;
[and]
(c) all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements
that States may conclude among themselves or within the
community and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 206
The Tribunal is directed to develop its own case law, ‘having regard to applicable treaties,
general principles and rules of public international law and any rules and principles of the law of
States.’ 207 The Protocol provides ‘Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the
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consent of other parties to the dispute [is] not . . . required.’ 208 The Tribunal does not have
original jurisdiction, but it may give preliminary rulings in certain cases. 209

According to the Treaty for the Establishment of SADC, ‘The Tribunal shall give advisory
opinions on such matters as the Summit or the Council may refer to it.’ 210 The SADC Summit
and Council are the only entities that the Treaty and the Protocol allow to request advisory
opinions. The Tribunal has ‘exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between the States and the
Community. Such disputes may be referred to the Tribunal . . . by the competent institution or
organ of the Community.’ 211 It also has ‘exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between natural
or legal persons and the Community. Such disputes may be referred to the Tribunal . . . by the
competent institution or organ of the Community.’ 212

The Tribunal has ‘jurisdiction over disputes between States.’ 213 Where there is a dispute
between the Community and a State, the State may refer the issue to the Tribunal. 214 The
Tribunal ‘may [also] rule on a question of interpretation, application or validity of the provisions
in issue if the question is referred to it by a court or tribunal of a State for a preliminary ruling in
accordance with this Protocol.’ 215 As such, the Tribunal has ‘jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings in proceedings of any kind and between any parties before the courts or tribunals of
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States.’ 216 In addition, as is typical of other African RTA judiciairies, the Tribunal has exclusive
jurisdiction over all disputes between natural and legal persons and SADC and the person may
bring the suit. 217 A natural or legal person may only bring suit against a Member State ‘unless
he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic
jurisdiction.’ 218 Finally, the Tribunal has ‘exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between the
Community and its staff relating to their conditions of employment.’ 219

The Tribunal’s legitimacy has been brought into sharp focus as a result of its decision on
Zimbabwe’s land reform program. Following that decision, many officials within Zimbabwe’s
government argued that the Tribunal does not currently exist for reasons we shall see below.
The Tribunal has reported its findings to the Summit and is awaiting action to determine if the
Tribunal’s decision should be recorded by the Member States. The next part of this paper will
now examine the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.

The SADC Tribunal’s Jurisprudence
The case that started the controversy over the SADC Tribunal’s legitimacy is Mike Campbell
(Pvt) Ltd. and 78 Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe. 220 The applicants, natural and legal
persons, in that case were land-owners challenging Zimbabwe’s land reform program which
essentially permitted taking the applicants’ land from them and redistributing it. 221 The Tribunal
determined that it only had jurisdiction if: (1) the applicants had standing in that they had
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‘exhaust[ed] all available remedies or . . . [were] unable to proceed under the domestic
jurisdiction of [Zimbabwe]’; and (2) the dispute related to interpretation and application of the
Treaty. 222

The Tribunal first determined if the dispute was within its scope of jurisdiction. 223 The
applicants began their case at the Tribunal on October 11, 2007 with an application for an
interim measure under Article 28 of the Protocol on Tribunal to restrain the government of
Zimbabwe from removing the applicants from their land. 224 However, the respondent argued the
applicants had not exhausted all of their local remedies as they had begun a case before the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. 225 The Tribunal, however, determined:
The rationale for exhaustion of local remedies is to enable local
courts to first deal with the matter because they are well placed to
deal with the legal issues involving national law before them. It
also ensures that the international tribunal does not deal with cases
which could easily have been disposed of by national courts. 226
Therefore, the Tribunal reasoned:
[W]here the municipal law does not offer any remedy or the
remedy that is offered is ineffective, the individual is not required
to exhaust local remedies. Further, where . . . the procedure of
achieving the remedies would have been unduly prolonged, the
individual is not expected to exhaust local remedies. 227
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The Tribunal thus determined that if an applicant’s local remedies suffered from de facto
exhaustion, the Tribunal would have jurisdiction. In fact, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had
already rendered a decision in the applicants’ case, 228 as discussed below.

The applicants in the Tribunal’s case were challenging Section 16B of Amendment 17 of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe. 229 Subsection (3)(b) of that section states ‘a person having any right
or interest in the [reorganized] land . . . shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of
the land by the State, and no court shall entertain any such challenge.’ 230 Therefore, the Tribunal
determined, the amendment had ‘ousted the jurisdiction of the courts of law in Zimbabwe from
any case related to acquisition of agricultural land and that, as such, the first and second
Applicants were unable to institute proceedings under the domestic jurisdiction.’ 231 The
Tribunal noted that this position was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe on January
22, 2008 in the applicants’ case. 232

The Tribunal next had to determine if there was a proper basis of jurisdiction such that it could
hear the dispute; i.e. whether the dispute related to interpretation and application of the Treaty. 233
On this issue, the respondent argued there was no such base as the Treaty only mentions human
rights as a principle of SADC and there is no protocol that governs human rights standards or
agrarian reform. 234 The respondent went on to argue that, in the absence of such protocols, the
Tribunal cannot adopt ‘[human rights] standards from other Treaties as this would amount to
228
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legislating on behalf of SADC Member States.’ 235 The Tribunal, however, noted that Article
21(b) of the Treaty mandates the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence and to do so having
regard for general principles and rules of public international law. 236 Article 4(c) requires
Member States to act in accordance with ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law.’ 237
Therefore, as long as one of these interconnected principles had been violated by Zimbabwe the
Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the dispute under Article 15(2) of the Treaty. The Tribunal
noted that Amendment 17 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe denied the respondents access to the
courts and the right to a fair hearing and so determined that their human rights, democracy, and
the rule of law had been violated and that the Tribunal had jurisdiction. 238

After granting jurisdiction the Tribunal went on to discuss the substantive questions raised in the
case. In its ruling, it held that the applicants had been discriminated against on the ground of
race, the respondent owed the applicants fair compensation for the lands that had been taken
from them, and both the respondent and Amendment 17 itself were in breach of Articles 4(c) 239
and 6(2) 240 of the Treaty. 241
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Zimbabwe did not comply with the Tribunal’s ruling. 242 Instead, Zimbabwe argued it had not
ratified the Protocol on Tribunal and therefore it did not have to abide by the decision of the
Tribunal. Second, Zimbabwe argued that as the summit had not formally made it operational, the
SADC Tribunal was not yet established and as such it did not in fact exist.243 The first of these
two arguments is certainly the weaker. Even though Article 22 of the Treaty states, ‘Each
Protocol shall be binding only on the Member States that are party to the Protocol in question’,
the Article which sets up the Tribunal, Article 16, states, ‘The composition, powers, functions,
procedures and other related matters governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol,
which shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 22 of this Treaty, form an integral part of
this Treaty, adopted by the Summit.’ 244 In other words, once the protocol has been officially
adopted it became binding on all Member States as is the Treaty itself, regardless of individual
ratification.

The second argument is a bit stronger. SADC protocols only come into force once they have
been approved by the Summit on recommendation by the Council 245 and are ratified by twothirds of the Member States. 246 As of September 2009 only five of SADC’s 15 Member States
had ratified it. 247 However, going back to Article 16, the two-thirds ratification requirement
specifically does not apply to the Protocol on Tribunal. Notably, the Article 22 two-thirds
ratification requirement, and the Article 16 exemption from that requirement, were added in
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2001 when the Treaty was amended. 248 So even though some Zimbabwean officials have argued
that the 2001 Amendment itself is invalid and therefore the exemption does not apply, 249 this
offers no support to Zimbabwe’s position because, if the amendment is invalid, so is the twothirds ratification requirement itself.

Perhaps the simplest and best argument for the enforcement of Tribunal decisions is that the
ratification of the Protocol on Tribunal is irrelevant to the Tribunal’s existence and authority.
Article 9(1)(g) of the Treaty which establishes the Tribunal and Article 16(1) thereof spells out
its jurisdiction. It is important to note that Zimbabwe nominated a current Tribunal Member,
Justice Antonia Guvava, to the Tribunal in 2005, 250 which contradicts its claim that it does not
believe the Tribunal to be in existence. Justice Guvava was, in fact, appointed to the Tribunal
and is one of the five alternate members of the court. 251 In September 2009, Justice Minister
Patrick Chinamasa of Zimbabwe announced that they would be withdrawing Guvava from the
Tribunal. 252 It is noteworthy that no official action was ever taken on the part of Zimbabwe’s
government to withdraw Guvava or to pull out from Tribunal participation. 253

On July 29, 2008 the High Court of South Africa decided in Von Abo v. Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others that citizens of South Africa whose property had been taken
by the Zimbabwean government would be owed damages from the government of South Africa
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where the government had failed to protect their interests through diplomatic intervention. 254
The court made the following orders: South African citizens have a right to ‘diplomatic
protection’ from violations of their rights by the government of Zimbabwe to be given to them
by the government of South Africa; the government of South Africa has a constitutional
obligation to provide this protection; the government of South Africa had to remedy the
violations of the applicant’s rights; and an award of damages to the applicant was postponed
pending South Africa’s compliance with the order of the High Court and subsequent judicial
proceedings. 255

On 7 May 2009 William Michael Campbell, the second applicant in the Tribunal’s Mike
Campbell case, discussed above, and Richard Thomas Etheredge petitioned the Tribunal for a
declaration that Zimbabwe was in breach and contempt of the decision in Mike Campbell. 256
The Tribunal made such a declaration in June 2009 and reported its finding to the Summit for
appropriate action under Article 32(5) 257 of the Protocol on Tribunal. 258

The Von Abo applicant then went before the Constitutional Court of South Africa, whose
decision was made on 5 June 2009. 259 Section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa
states ‘a High Court . . . may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of . . . any
conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is
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confirmed by the Constitutional Court.’ On 5 June 2009 the Constitutional Court of South
Africa held that the order of the High Court did not need to be affirmed by the Constitutional
Court in this instance because the High Court declared the conduct of the South African
government to be invalid, rather than the conduct of the president individually within the
meaning of Section 172(2)(a). 260

South Africa-Zimbabwe BIPPA and Fick
In late November 2009 the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe were on their way
toward signing the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA). 261 The
BIPPA was aimed at providing security for South African investments in Zimbabwe, but it
expressly excluded past claims arising from Zimbabwe’s land reform program 262, the very
program at issue in Mike Campbell. In November 2009, South African legal consultants Jeremy
Gauntlett and F.B. Pelser advised the South African government that if it were to sign BIPPA as
it was South Africa would be in violation of international law as it would compromise the
Tribunal’s order and unlawfully terminate all remedies for past human rights violations, the
uncompensated taking of land. 263

On 27 November 2009, AfriForum, a farmers’ rights organization, petitioned the High Court of
South Africa to enjoin the South African government from signing BIPPA. 264 The parties settled
out of court that day in Fick and Three Others v. Government of the Republic of South Africa and
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Two Others. 265 The South African North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria announced the
agreement in its entirety as follows:
1. The proposed Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (BIPPA) between the
government of Zimbabwe and that of South Africa, to be
concluded on 27 November 2009 in Harare, aims to create
legal and other remedies for South African citizens over and
above existing remedies in terms of international law.
2. The First and Second Respondent hereby give the Applicants
(and other South African Citizens in the Applicants’ position)
the assurance that BIPPA does not affect existing rights or
remedies in terms of other sources of international law, in
particular those in terms of the Treaty of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
3. Thus the efficacy of the rulings and orders by the SADC
Tribunal in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of
Zimbabwe [2008] SADC (T) 02/2007 (28 November 2008) and
William Michael Campbell and Another v The Republic of
Zimbabwe [2009] SADC (T) 03/2009 (05 June 2009) is not
affected by entering into the proposed BIPPA, which rulings
and orders the Government of the Republic of South Africa
respects and undertakes to honour [sic] in terms of its own
obligations in terms the SADC Treaty.
4. The matter is removed from the roll, with no order as to
costs. 266
That same day the governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa signed BIPPA. 267

On 5 February 2010 the North Gauteng High Court of South Africa in Pretoria continued where
it had left off in 2008. 268 In the continued proceedings, the Court ruled the government of South
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Africa was bound by the decision of the Tribunal in Mike Campbell. 269 The court decided the
South African government was at fault for not protecting the applicant’s property rights in
Zimbabwe through the use of diplomatic intervention, that the government had not complied
with the High Court’s 2008 ruling, and, as such, determined that the South African government
was ‘liable to pay to the applicant such damages as he may prove that he has suffered as a result
of the violation of his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe.’ 270 AfriForum has announced its
intention to the Supreme Court of South Africa to fully enforce the Tribunal’s ruling in South
Africa on February 23, 2010. 271

When the Fick settlement above is read in conjunction with the High Court’s rulings in the Von
Abo case it seems that South Africa has found a way to successfully protect its citizens while
simultaneously abiding by the Tribunal’s decision in Mike Campbell and allowing Zimbabwe to
continue seizing land. As long as South Africa is willing to pay damages to its citizens who
suffered injury as a result of Zimbabwe’s land reform program it is abiding by Von Abo, Mike
Campbell, and the BIPPA. However, this ignores the fact that Zimbabwe continues to decline to
abide by the Tribunal’s ruling, discussed below. South Africa would only be made whole if
Zimbabwe abides by the BIPPA. 272 The Commercial Farmers’ Union of Zimbabwe has reported
that three farmers whose land was seized in December and January were covered by the
BIPPA. 273
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On 26 January 2010, the High Court of Zimbabwe in Harare dismissed a suit by Gramara, Ltd.,
one of the ‘other’ applicants in Mike Campbell, which sought a declaration that the Tribunal’s
decision in Mike Campbell should be enforced in Zimbabwe. 274 The court found that
Amendment 17, Section 16B(3)(b)’s domestic constitutionality was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe in Mike Campbell (Pty) Ltd. v. Minister of National Security Responsible for
Land, Land Reform and Resettlement. 275 That section states that ‘a person having any right or
interest in the [reorganized] land . . . shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of the
land by the State, and no court shall entertain any such challenge.’ 276 The court explained that
since ‘the indirect consequence of the Tribunal's judgment is to impugn the legality of the
programme sanctioned by the Supreme Court . . . [and] challenge[s] the decision of the Supreme
Court within its jurisdictional domain and thereby undermine[s] the authority of th[e Supreme]
Court in Zimbabwe’, the Tribunal’s decision must be ignored. 277 Furthermore, the court
maintained, Section 3 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe proclaims: ‘This Constitution is the
supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other
law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’ 278 This is in clear conflict with Article 27
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that, ‘A party may not invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’ Since the
Tribunal was ‘constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions
of [the SADC] Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be
274
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referred to it’ 279 and ‘[t]he decisions of the Tribunal [are] final and binding’ 280, any violation of
an order of the Tribunal is a violation of the SADC Treaty itself, regardless of domestic law.

The High Court of Zimbabwe however determined that:
[E]nforcement of the [Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd.] decision . . .
would ultimately necessitate the Government having to reverse all
the land acquisitions that have taken place since 2000. Apart from
the political enormity of any such exercise, it would entail the
eviction, upheaval and eventual relocation of many if not most of
the beneficiaries of the land reform programme. This programme,
despite its administrative and practical shortcomings, is
quintessentially a matter of public policy in Zimbabwe, conceived
well before the country attained its sovereign independence.
As for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the applicants before
the Tribunal and others in their position are absolutely correct in
expecting the Government of Zimbabwe to comply with its
obligations under the SADC Treaty and to implement the decisions
of the Tribunal. However, I take it that there is an incomparably
greater number of Zimbabweans who share the legitimate
expectation that the Government will effectively implement the
land reform programme and fulfil [sic] their aspirations thereunder.
Given these countervailing expectations, public policy as informed
by basic utilitarian precept would dictate that the greater public
good must prevail. 281
Therefore, the Tribunal’s decision in Mike Campbell was found to be contrary to Zimbabwean
law, both judicially and constitutionally, and Zimbabwean public policy. 282

It would seem that the SADC Tribunal as well as South African and Zimbabwean quite a bit on
Zimbabwe’s land seizure. SADC Tribunal Registrar Mkandawire has said ‘The Zimbabwe issue
is no longer in the hands of the Tribunal. We have done what we are mandated to do but cannot
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enforce the decisions. We have reported the farm violations to the SADC summit. It is the SADC
summit which now has to enforce the decisions made by the Tribunal.’ 283 Therefore, the
legitimacy of the Tribunal rests in the hands of the Summit.

Conclusions

This paper’s discussion of African regional trade judiciaries indicates that their relative
invisibility in academic and policy discussions is unwarranted. These judiciaries have exercised
their jurisdiction over a burgeoning number of cases particularly in the area of human rights and
increasingly over economic and trade disputes. The EACJ as well as the SADC Tribunals have
been exemplary in making bold decisions which were not well received by Member States. The
ECOWAS Tribunal had its jurisdiction expanded to include human rights cases. These trends
show that even while African governments are not fully committed to fully funding these
regional judiciaries, these judiciaries have nevertheless began to actively build an emerging
regional jurisprudence that only a few short years ago did not exist. That these judiciaries have
been able to do as much with relatively little support from respective member governments is
testimony to the emerging cadre and high caliber of judges who staff these regional courts.

What is needed now is a continuing to expand the number legal practitioners who can advice
their clients on how these African RTA regimes offer them opportunities to use the remedies
these RTA judiciaries are empowered to give. Such remedies, of course, include the trade
remedy regimes of antidumping and countervailing duty law which have been borrowed from the
WTO. They, of course, also include the possibility of challenging the broad range of NTB
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measures that exist in trade between African countries. The potential for using these African
RTA judiciaries is, therefore, quite broad and this potential awaits future exploitation to the hilt.
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